Abstract This paper addresses one of the fundamental problems of the philosophy of information: How does semantic information emerge within the underlying dynamics of the world? dynamical semantic information problem. It suggests that the canonical approach to semantic information that denes data before meaning and meaning before use is inadequate for pre-cognitive information media. Instead, we should follow a pragmatic approach to information where one denes the notion of information system as a special kind of purposeful system emerging within the underlying dynamics of the world, and dene semantic information as the currency of the system. In this way, systems operating with semantic information can be viewed as patterns in the dynamics semantic information is a dynamical system phenomenon of highly organized systems. In the This is a pre-print for an article accepted for publication in 
Introduction
This paper addresses one of the fundamental problems of the philosophy of information: How does semantic information emerge within the underlying dynamics of the world? Let us call this the dynamical semantic information (DSI) problem. DSI is related to problems #2 and #4 in the list of 18 fundamental problems of the philosophy of information that Luciano Floridi has compiled (2010; 2008b) . Problem #2 is The I/O problem: what are the dynamics of information? Problem #4 is the data grounding problem: how can data acquire their meaning? DSI is also related to a third problem, not explicitly enumerated in Floridi's list. This is the problem of the pragmatics of information: how can information-using systems exist and what makes them such. I tackle three problems of information theory not out of ambition but out of necessity. Indeed, it is one of the central claims of this paper that, in the simplest cases of semantic information, these problems must be approached simultaneously. In the sim-plest information systems those systems that utilize semantic information the pragmatic, semantic and structural/syntactic aspects of information are codetermined and must be investigated simultaneously.
The paper is related to another kind of problem: can we provide a foundation of cognitive science with the notion of (semantic) information? It is my conviction that we can, and I suggest how elsewhere. (Vakarelov forthcoming) The project of the foundation of cognitive science places a negative constraint on a general theory of semantic information. At least some information systems must be pre-cognitive. Of course, we are cognitive systems, and the kinds of informational media that are interesting for us, such as languages, maps, etc., are allowed to depend on cognitive tools. The gimmicks of cognition make information a powerful phenomenon, no doubt. Still, the project demands, information systems and thus semantic information must be able to exist without cognition.
My strategy for addressing DSI is this: Start with a notion of Information System (IS) that is a special kind of autonomous dynamical system interacting with an environment. Describe semantic information as a currency of the information system. That is, treat information for the system not as a primitive but as a derived notion, similar to the way currency is a derived notion of an economic system. Take a decomposition approach to analyzing the components of semantic information that is, regard notions such as data, meaning, and source, as depicting aspects of informational processes with the information system. Provide a theory of meaning, the interface theory of meaning, for the informational states (data states) of an information medium within the information system. Finally, I address a current debate about whether truthfulness should be required as a condition for semantic information. The contrast is between a theory of strongly semantic information (SSI) , which demands that truthfulness be part of information, and a theory of weakly semantic information (WSI) , which regards semantic information as simply meaningful data. My account of semantic information does not t directly in either of the accounts. It is more general than both.
The question is: of which theory is it a more natural generalization, SSI or WSI? I will argue that DSI is a more natural generalization of SSI, and thus it provides indirect support to the SSI view. However, WSI is a theoretically useful notion because it can be interpreted as the currency of semantically decoupleable information systems. A unied theory of information, if possible, would require both SSI and WSI notions of information.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the canonical approach to semantic information and points out some diculties related to the generality of the approach. Section 3 oers an alternative approach suggesting that the most general kind of information is pragmatic information and that semantic information must be investigated within the framework of a pragmatic theory of information. Section 4 introduces the notion of information system and explains why it oers a non-circular basis for dening semantic information. Up to this point the paper develops the conceptual footing of the project. The following sections address the specic problem of DSI. Section 5 outlines the strategy for analyzing information systems, and thus semantic information, as a dynamical system phenomenon information systems are a special class of organized complex dynamical systems. Section 6 offers a general theory of meaning the interface theory of meaning appropriate for the general information systems discussed in the earlier sections. Section 7 addresses the SSI vs. WSI debate.
Canonical Views of Semantic Information
Few things are canonical about semantic information, but for the purposes of this paper I will assume that canonical views of semantic information have the following form: (1) semantic information = data + meaning (+ truthfulness), (2) the data is conceptually primary. For the moment I will bracket the debate about whether semantic information must be true information. I will return to the issue in Section 7. Floridi (2003; describes this as the General Denition of semantic Information (GDI). According to this view, to provide an account of information is to provide an account of the structure of the data, and furthermore to provide an account of what makes the data meaningful.
The data is a non-empty set of distinctions and each datum is well-formed. The well-formedness condition, minimally, assumes that it is possible to distinguish between the dierent datums and to separate data from non-data. Some data systems may have further syntactic structure. For example, languages may have (compositional) grammar, etc.
Given the data, one can provide an account of how meaning is determined. There can be dierent theories of meaning, i.e. dierent ways to specifying content to a datum. For a language or a map, content may be provided by a reference relation or by specication of a functional role. It is usually assumed that in order for the question of meaning to arise, one must have the system of data on hand. Conceptually, data is more primitive than semantics. Data is, or so the assumption goes, a necessary condition for meaning. For, if there are no meaning vehicles, how can we talk about meaning?
Meaning of what?
Naturally, semantic information is interesting to an informee because it can be useful to satisfy a goal. Having the information that a tiger is hiding in the bush changes the behavior of the informee to avoid or hunt the tiger. This aspect of information is the problem of the pragmatics of information. It is widely acknowledged that pragmatics places important constraints on semantics and syntax. (Bar-Hillel 1964; Barwise & Seligman 1997; Dretske 1981; Floridi 2010 ) Nevertheless, one further, third, assumption of the canonical view of semantic information is that one can provide an account of semantic information independently, and prior to providing an account of how information is used.
Thus, one implicit feature of the canonical view of semantic information is the conceptual priority of data (or syntax) over meaning (or semantics), and of meaning over use (or pragmatics) . This idea suggests how to interpret the + in the composite expression data + meaning (+ truthfulness) + use. The + is regarded as an amendment operation. Therefore, I will call the view where data is conceptually primary, meaning secondary, and use third-ary, an amendment view of semantic information. The amendment view goes back to Shannon and Weaver, who quite explicitly acknowledge the three levels of problems of information, only to isolate the syntactic level, which is the focus of Shannon's theory. (Shannon 1948; Weaver & Shannon 1963 ) Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) also quite explicitly make the same acknowledgment, only to focus on semantic information. And so do Dretske (1981); Fetzer (2004); Floridi (2003 Floridi ( , 2010 Floridi ( , 2004 Floridi ( , 2005 Floridi ( , 2007 , and many others, see (Floridi 2010: 3.4) for extensive references.
In many respects, adopting an amendment view is irrelevant to the structure of a formal theory of semantic information. One is interested in describing the structure of the data, the nature of meaning, etc. Which is conceptually prior is lost in the nal product. This is important because it implies that even if one questions the amendment view, as I will do in a moment, one does not thereby aect the formal theories of syntactic or semantic information. However, the amendment view aects meta-theoretical judgments.
One important meta-theoretical judgment aected by the amendment view is when one theory of information is more general than another theory. Within the amendment view it is natural to obtain a more general notion of information by obtaining a more general notion of data. Thus, one may start with a paradigm example of an information medium, (e.g.) language, and relax some of its characteristics. One may move from language, to map, to continuous signal systems, to abstract category theoretic system of classications and info-morphisms. (Barwise & Seligman 1997) The more abstract and general the theory, the weaker the constraints from semantics or pragmatics.
When is an amendment view appropriate? Obviously, only when the structure of the data can be specied independently. In many cases it can. In formal systems trivially it can. This is partly what makes them formal. Thus, in mathematical theories of information, such as Shannon's probabilistic theory of communication, the related Carnap and Bar-Hillel theory of semantic information, Kolmogorov/Chaitin/Solomono algorithmic theory of information 1 , or the Barwise & Seligman's theory of information ow, etc., one begins with the assumption that the data set is given in advance. A language comes with a xed alphabet (and a probability distribution); a set of numeric sequences is well-dened (in algorithmic information theory); or, one can dene a network of classications with a xed set of tokens and types (in Barwise and Seligman's theory) . In all these cases one does not provide an account of how the data system is dened, except formally; one simply takes for granted that it is.
But, when can the data set be specied? Formal media, where the data structures can be manipulated independently of meaning or use, can be dened provided underlying stable structures can be created, and mechanisms for reproduction or transformation of the structures can be oered. Purely symbolic media depend on: the stability of the ink on paper, the ability of the human cognitive system to recognize reliably the symbols and how they enter in expressions, the encoding convention of ASCII systems and the ability of devices to copy, transmit, and convert the codes, including converting them to forms readable by a human, etc. Mixed media, like maps or diagrams, have similar requirements. General digital data systems depend on carefully crafted physical devices, such as RAM cells, CPUs, CDs, Hard Drives, etc. All of these devices are crafted to maintain reliable states, to interface with other devices, and to transmit digital signals correctly. That is, the devices meet engineering specications in virtue of which they count as data and information media. We can safely say that all common information media with clearly speciable data sets are media that result ultimately of human construction or interpretation.
How about natural information media? Are they not independent of human construction or interpreta-1 For a technical introduction see (Li & Vitanyi 1997) , for a philosophical introduction see (Adriaans 2008; Grunwald & Vitanyi 2008) tion? We can regard the tree rings, it is claimed, as a data system that contains semantic information about the age of the tree. Note, however, that isolating the rings of a tree as a datum requires ignoring some variations of the tree and focusing on others. The same tree could have had its tree rings slightly dierently, yet of the same number and same average thickness. In such a case, the dierent rings would count as the same data type (similar to the way the letter`a' can be written with dierent fonts). Specication of the data system requires specication of what variations are signicant and what must be ignored. This idea is captured by the notion of level of abstraction. (Floridi & Sanders 2004; Floridi 2008a ). Specication of a data system always requires a specication of a level of abstraction. In the case of the tree rings, there are nomic dependencies that support the semantic relation between the rings and the age, but the specication of this level of abstraction as opposed to another requires 2 the interpretation act of a cognitive agent. Nature, in its nomic patterns, oers many opportunities for data systems that can be given semantic signicance, it oers ubiquitous potential datums, but it does not oer any well-dened and complete data sets. The tree rings, as a data system, are not constructed by human cognition, but they are interpreted by the human cognition.
It is reasonable to conjecture that the cases where the data set can be specied independently of meaning and use are cases where a cognitive system is involved indispensably in the process of specication. This is not to say that the informational medium must be a part of a cognitive system, or that investigating its informational properties requires bringing in cognition.
But, if the conjecture is correct, it would follow that no informational medium appropriate for an amendment analysis could exist without a cognitive system in the background. Now, this is only a conjecture I have oered only an inductive argument but it is sucient to support a methodological prescription: If we want to provide a notion of semantic information that is pre-cognitive, we should reconsider the priority of the components of semantic information.
Instead of starting from within and working outward by regarding the data set as conceptually primitive we can start from without and work inward. We can start with pragmatism and let the components of semantic information be co-determined. I call this the decomposition approach, where the notion of semantic information is dened rst and then its components are decomposed from it as aspects of the informational process.
2 The requirement is not constitutive, of course, but causal.
3 The pragmatic approach to semantic information Pragmatism in general, and the pragmatic approach to semantics in particular, is fundamentally a theory about what the general scenario is where meaning assignment occurs. The general scenario is one where a user utilizes some meaning vehicle system, a medium, in its interaction with another system. In the scenario the meaning, which could be a classical representation relation, is determined by the nature of the interaction and the mode in which the user regards the medium the signicance of the medium for the user in the interaction. The meaning vehicle obtains its semantic characteristics in virtue of the intermediary role that it plays in the interaction. Here I have purposefully avoided some of the technical language used by pragmatist, going back to Peirce, to describe the situation and to provide theories of the sign utilization process often described as semiosis, following Peirce (1940, based on work from 1890s) and later Morris (1938) .
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For us the important point is the strategy and its con- Morris' (and Saussure's) . (Burch 2010) 4 They are atypical, even though they are ubiquitous and highly salient in human experience. Similarly, an atmosphere high in oxygen is highly atypical as far as planetary atmospheres go, even thought for us it is the stereotypical atmosphere.
that the user of the signs is a thinking being, and he regarded ideas as a sui generis notion in the theory.
For him, the mind qua mental, was an irreducible and an essential element of semiosis. The theory was not intended to provide a basis for the study of mind itself, at least not directly.
In the second part of the 20th century, with the emergence of system theory and one of its ospring, cybernetics (Wiener 1965; Turchin 1990 ), a more abstract, mind-independent version of the pragmatic program was attempted. Within this tradition it became possible to generalize the semiotic notions of sign and sign interpretation with the help of the notion of information. It also became possible to ask whether and how information can be used as a principle of cognition.
The most systematic attempt to understand information within the pragmatic/semiotic tradition was made by Deode Nauta, in his The Meaning of Information. (1970) In it, Nauta argues that information is fundamentally a semiotic notion, and that the most general phenomena where the notion of information is appropriate are pragmatic. That is, in the most general case, the notions of information and information content make sense only when there exists a user of the information and the informational mechanisms are a part of the control mechanisms of the user.
The strategy of pragmatic analysis of information is the following: The most basic notion is information system (or i-system in Nauta's terminology). An information system s is a physical/dynamical system that is in active interaction with an external environment and that satises a set of conditions C. ( We will discuss what C could be below.) The important requirement is that the conditions C do not presuppose the notion of information. Instead, C must be some set of system conditions on s related to the dynamical or physical organization of s and on the mode of interaction of s with the environment. C must guarantee the existence in s of a sub-system, M , that can be interpreted as an information medium. Moreover, the functional role of M in s in relation to the interaction with the environment, must be sucient to dene the semantic content of the states of M .
According to this strategy, s is an information system not because it operates with meaningful (and truthful) data, i.e. because it operates with information, but conversely, it operates with information because it is an information system. The most important idea is that what counts as data and what gives the data semantic content is determined by the role it plays in the information system.
As stated, all we have is a strategy. There is nothing to demand that the pragmatic approach has some advantages over the classical view. How the strategy performs depends on the conditions C, and on how the conditions allow a denition of M and a denition of semantic content. If C is such that one can always dene the data set rst, and only then the meaning of the data, then the strategy reduces to the amendment view.
If C includes some cognitive or mental requirements, then the notion of information cannot be pre-cognitive.
C, for example, could include the condition that s satises the physical symbol system hypothesis.
5 (Newell & Simon 1981) Then, to be a data set is to be a symbolic expression. To have semantic content is to refer to another expression or a symbolic rule governed process.
For s to interact with its environment is for s to have some input/output behavior. This example shows that the pragmatic strategy is suciently general to capture certain familiar conceptions of information processing.
However, if this is all there is to being an information system, the pragmatic strategy is worse o because it brings unnecessary complications. One nice feature of symbol systems is that they can be described formally, only at the level of data relations. There is no point to bringing the user system because it gets abstracted away in the analysis.
The pragmatic strategy oers the hope of producing a condition C that is pre-cognitive, naturalizable, and that claries how information systems may emerge.
If this is possible, one can use the strategy to provide a naturalistic account of informational phenomena in general. The idea is that it is easier to provide a bottom up naturalistic theory of information systems than to provide a naturalistic theory of information directly.
This still does not imply that the amendment view is inappropriate in the general case of information systems.
The failure of the amendment view is exposed by the actual proposed solution that fullls the hope. To this I turn next. 5. s contains a second distinct sub-system (or mechanism) P that lters the states of M and their eect on E to satisfy its purpose. In other words, P steers the system towards G by modulating the eect of
Let us analyze the conditions of the denition. We will do this incrementally to see what each of the conditions adds. It is helpful to divide the conditions into two groups. Conditions 13 can be regarded as conditions for an autonomous system. These are conditions of the system as a whole. The conditions identify the systems for which the architectural qualication, information system, becomes relevant. Conditions 4 and 5 target the internal organization of the autonomous system that make it an information system the actual architecture of the system. First I will focus on the conditions of autonomy.
The minimal condition here is the open system condition. A system must be isolated for theoretical focus.
It must be possible to identify a suciently cohesive, 6 Nauta uses the term emitter. I prefer the term eector.
Emitter has the connotation of something being emitted, while eector conveys the idea of a general causal eect.
7 We assume that both M and P are non-trivial systems. That is, M and P play an active role in the dynamics of s.
temporally extended sub-system, s, of the world such that description of s in terms of variables restricted to s can be a basis for an eective description of aspects of the behavior of s. For example, s may be a rock.
The structural links of the molecules of the rock make it appropriate to describe the rock in terms of aggre- The last condition of autonomy is the condition of purposeful system. One necessary requirement to describe a system as purposeful is the identication of a set of goal states G and some metric specifying how far the system is from G. A second necessary requirement is for the system to have some tendency to move towards G or at least to put an eort to move towards G. The dynamics of the eectors must be such that it creates a tendency to minimize the distance to G, even if external factors completely overwhelm the eort. A sh can swim towards food, even if the current is faster than the sh, and it actually gets farther from the food. Because the condition of purposefulness does not depend only on the system but also on the specication of the set G, it is really a relational condition. Every system may be regarded, trivially, as purposeful with respect to some set of states just make G to be the entire state space. Or, if the system has some attractors in its state space, the set of attractors can make the system into a purposeful system.
Saying that a system is purposeful is interesting if there are independent reasons to identify the set G. In some cases such reasons exist. In biological systems natural goal sets are the set of states where the system is in good health, or the set of states where the system is likely to produce t ospring. More specic goals may be states where the system can have access to nutrients and energy, where it can be protected from predators, etc. What makes such states special may depend on the system's organization. The organization of aerobic bacteria is such that they can extract energy from oxygen.
Oxygen has a normative signicance for such bacteria, it is a good. (Maturana & Varela 1980; Weber & Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005) If the bacteria can modulate its eectors to move towards an oxygen rich environment, we can regard the set of oxygen rich states as the goal states of the bacteria its G and we can regard the bacteria as a purposeful system with respect to G. For articial systems G can be determined by the designer. For the designer of an active seeking missile, the goal states are the states where the missile destroys an enemy.
The idea of autonomy can be summarized as follows: the system can selectively control its behavior so that it can (attempt) to achieve a goal it can engage in goal-directed behavior. The central idea is that the locus of control is in the system itself, and the control is purposeful. For i-systems, the locus is determined by the higher local relevance density of the receptor to effector pathway, which is part of the system. Peirce was aware of the thermostat problem. He was unhappy with the possibility that sunowers may be regarded as using signs. (Peirce 1940) His solution was to insist that the interpretant of the sign must be a mind.
From a naturalistic standpoint this is unacceptable.
9
A pragmatist approach allows happenings after M to determine its informational status. The proposal requires a further system P , a purposeful lter, that mediates the connection between M and E. What dierence does P make? It has two important eects: (1) it decouples M from E, and (2) (Barwise & Perry 1983) as well as the many contributions in (Aczel et al. 1993; Cooper et al. 1990 Cooper et al. , 1991 9 Peirce would have disagreed that the account is not naturalistic. This, however, is related to his somewhat obscure metaphysics, which had pan-physicist elements. (Burch 2010) the system, particularly on E. M deserves independent theoretical focus.
The fact that P is a purposeful lter i.e. it is sensitive to how close the system is to G and it modulates the connection between M and E to minimize the difference allows the normative distinctions that arise with respect to G to transfer to the states of M . The states of M can be evaluated as to their relevance and signicance for moving towards the goal.
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Why should i-systems be information systems? We should be careful how we manage our intuitions here. isystems are quite general, and we should not expect to meet the familiar information media immediately. As I insisted above, i-systems are pre-cognitive, while the familiar information media require cognitive machinery.
Instead, we should focus on the theoretical merits of describing i-systems as (semantic) information systems.
i-systems should be the minimal systems that are usefully modeled as systems receiving information from the world, using the information, qua semantic information, to guide their behavior. It should be accepted that alternative, non-informational models may be available such as dynamical system models or mechanism/causal models and for some simple i-systems such alternative models may be equally eective in compressing the description of the behavior of the systems.
The question is, why should M be regarded as an 
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The word dynamical indicates the requirement that the world is viewed as a dynamical system, described with the machinery of dynamical system theory. (Katok & Hasselblatt 1996; Hinrichsen & Pritchard 2005) We call this a dynamical system model (DSM) of a system:
The world at a given time is described as a point in 11 This is dierent from (though related to) the question of the information dynamics that some (Williams & Beer (Forthcoming) ) investigate, which is how information propagates and changes within a computational system. a phase space 12 , the space of all possible states of the world. The phase space is usually decomposed into a set of (independent) parameters (a vector base for the space). The temporal change of the world is described as a trajectory through the phase space.
The dynamical system theoretic analysis of a system is essentially counterfactual. One is not only interested by identifying a region on the phase space bounded by phase transitions, with order parameters tracking the organizational dynamics of the sub-system. The phase transition boundary is the life/dead boundary for the system, the internal region is the viability zone, and the order parameters can be the parameters describing the internal workings 13 of the system. Sub-systems can also be nested. In the general case one uses multiple interconnected phase spaces, dened for dierent overlapping regions of the global space. In this way one can model hierarchically organized systems, and dierent levels of functional organization.
The global system is regarded as a closed system; when dealing with sub-systems, however, it is important to model the interactions between the sub-systems and their environment. From now on I will drop thè sub-' prex and I will assume that we are modeling an open sub-system, consistent with the discussion in the previous sections. Thus, for a system s one separates the order parameters, and the parameters that track external inuences control parameters. 14 It is important to clear a potential terminological confusion here. The term`control parameter' is internal to Haken's theory of synergetics. (Haken 1993b ,a) Haken calls external inuence parameters`control parameters' because they are often used to control the behavior of self-organized systems. I also talk about control in a less technical sense: I say that a system controls its behavior, or that the locus of control lies in a system. In this more general notion of control, the control relations may depend solely on the order parameters (in Haken's sense) of the system. Also, some control parameters (in Haken's sense) may not have any control signicance in my sense. The terminology is unfortunate, but I stick to it to be consistent with the literature. Thus, when the expression`control parameter' is used, it is always in the technical sense of synergetics. Any other expression that has the word`control' is used in my (or a control system theoretic (Levine 1996)) sense.
15 There is a large recent literature attempting to analyze informational and cognitive system with the machinery of dynamical systems theory. (Thelen & Smith 1994; Kelso 1995; van Gelder. 1998; Beer 2000; Chemero 2009) tems as dynamical systems to be able to view semantic information as a dynamical system phenomenon. We want to focus on what conditions must be met to analyze a system as an information system, described in terms of informational states, semantic relations, and utilization of information.
I will take some shortcuts. I will assume that there exists a dynamical description of the sub-system s. s 17 Essentially, here I am assuming that the goal of the system is survival. Or, stated dierently, that the G states in the denition of a purposeful system compose the region V . that the behavior is more sensitive to control parameters, in which case the system is more heteronomous, i.e. externally controlled. We can observe that its behavior is more sensitive to order parameters, in which case the system is more autonomous or, if there is a complex, context sensitive interaction of inuences. 20 This is not a failure of the concept of control; it comes from the nature and diversity of dynamical systems.
To capture the notion of information system within a DSM, one must localize control signicance to a subsystem M and second order control signicance, control over the control role of M , to a sub-system P . P , furthermore, must be evaluated in light of its ability to maintain the system in the viability zone of the global phase space. M must be correlated with a particular set of control parameters the source system S and have a conditional eect, modulated by P , on the general trajectory of s (via E). The structure and topology of the ow of s admits of such decomposition. There must be an appropriate real pattern of the global dynamics of the system in the viability zone such that one can determine appropriate macro-states (really, a hierarchy of macro-states) and a dynamics of the system respecting the macro-states so that a collection of order parameters exist that track the patterns. Saying that a system is an information system is saying something about what patterns exist within the dynamics that there is a highly structured localized, goal-directed control modulated by a medium M .
In the most general case of an information system, the pattern of the dynamics spans the entire system and environment. Even if it is possible to identify the system M independently as a dynamical sub-system of s, it cannot be guaranteed that the states of M , let us call them the local micro-states 21 of M , are the states relevant for the informational system. We have to fur-20 On a low friction surface, such as ice, often the only possible way of steering corners fast is using the so called drift method, where the car slides sideways in the direction of the turn and one controls the attitude by adjusting the throttle (gas peddle). This is a very dicult and dangerous technique. Leave it for the professionals! Besides, most modern cars with front wheel drives and electronic stability control cannot drift steer. Also, Millikan's and those of the teleosemantic community. (Millikan 1987 (Millikan , 1995 (Millikan , 2006 ) I will focus below on an account due to Bogdan (Bogdan 1988a (Bogdan , 1994 , that is quite similar in spirit to mine. Bogdan's account diers from other externalist in that it takes goal-directedness to be a fundamental requirement for semantic informa- (1969b; 1969c) , who, as I indicated above, was a strong inuence to Nauta.
Bogdan, like me, wants a notion of semantic information to serve as a basis of understanding cognition. He makes a distinction between material information and semantic information. Material information in one receiver system from another source system results from the systematic, nomic relation between structures of the source and receiver. Such a notion of material information is fairly uncontroversial among people that take the notion of information seriously. It is what some describe as environmental information (Floridi 2003; Barwise & Seligman 1997; Dretske 1981) , or physical information, or potential-information (Nauta 1970) . Semantic information is a kind of material information where the from is converted to about it is when the receiver can be said to have information about the source. One way of understanding Bogdan's eort is as explicating in a naturalistic setup the notion of aboutness. To this end, semantic information is characterized as follows: Semantic information is material information with a functional business determined by teleology. (Bogdan 1988a: 89) The key task is explicating the notion of functional business determined by teleology. Bogdan's theory is complicated and it is not my goal to develop it here, nor is it to compare it to my use of goal-directedness which is based on Nauta. There are many similarities, and some apparent dierences in the two approaches, but, I must admit, it is still not completely clear to me how deep the dierences go. Here are some ideas that cast light on how teleology converts material information into semantic information. It does this in at least three ways: (1) the goal acts as a lter of relevance for aspects of the information source. Only some of the aspects (or features) of the source are relevant for goal-directed behavior. (2) It determines internal, architectural functions for the system using the material information to achieve the goal. It is not sucient for the system to have material information from the source of the aspects relevant for the goal. The system must be organized in a way material information which is nothing more than a form of nomic correlation can aect the system's goal-directed behavior. (3) It solves the proximal stimulus problem, i.e. it allows distinction between the true source of the information and any proximal systems in the information pathway from the source to the receptor that co-vary with the source. For example, a state of a visual system may contain material information from a chair, but also it may contain material information from the retina. Only the chair is relevant to the goal-directed activity of nding a place to rest. The retinal state has no rest-inducing properties.
(1) and (2) provide a basis for a system to utilize semantic information to select (and convert) material information to meaningful information. There is similarity between Bogdan's conditions (1) and (2) and Nauta's conditions of i-system. It is condition (3), however, that separates from from about. It xes the content of the information.
The semantics of Bogdan's notion of semantic information, the answer to the question What is the meaning of an information state m?, is of the form: m is about a system s and it is in so-and-so state (or has so-and-so probability distribution).
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The back-end of the information process the functional business focuses (or constrains) the front end the correlation 22 Bogdan actually does not address this question in (Bogdan 1988a (Bogdan , 1994 . He resists applying the term`meaning' to such simple systems to avoid undesirable connotations. (Private corresponds) But it seems to follow from the discussion that this would be the form of the answer, if one must be given. part but it is the correlation that determines the meaning. Now let us consider an internalist theory. MacKay's internalist account of meaning is aimed for the following general situation. There is a system S that is capable of goal-directed activity. S receives a message m. m could be a message sent by another system with a specic intention, or it could be a signal from the en- 23 It is possible that both S and M have independent macro-structure and the dynamical correlation relevant for the information system matches this independent structure. S is what it is intrinsically, M is what it is intrinsically, and they are simply connected by some causal process that matches the properties of S 23 This may be the informational equivalent to (and the dynamical basis of ) the phenomenological notion of umwelt (von Uexküll 1909 (von Uexküll , 1932 (von Uexküll , 1982 . Nauta explicitly utilizes the notion in his analysis of information systems.
with the properties of M and thus an information connection is formed. This possibility is, in fact, the standard conception of the information process as physical phenomena. While such a dynamical scenario is possible, it is not necessary.
In the general case we cannot assume that the macrostructure relevant for the information system description is determined locally. We may need to look at the entire dynamical system the entire process of interaction between the system and the environment as the basis of determination of the macroscopic structure.
24
To determine whether a particular macro-state of S is informationally relevant, i.e. whether it is dierentially signicant for the purposeful behavior of the system, we must trace the dynamical trajectories of the system and determine (at least) two things: (1) My denition is foremost technical. Still, there has to be some connection between it and more common notions of meaning. Otherwise it makes a deceptive use of terminology. The proper connection is that of generalization. The way to evaluate whether the dened notion deserves to be called meaning is to satisfy the following two requirements: (1) It must be a notion that can be dened within appropriate general framework.
(2) When the general framework is instantiated to the stereotypical case(s), the notion must reduce to the traditional notion. Thus, if the medium of an information system is a language, then the dierential interface function related to the linguistic expressions must boil down to something like a stereotypical notion of meaning. It must be noted that an instantiation operation,
as an inverse to a generalization operation, is one-tomany.
28 Generalization always looses complexity, so a language-using information system may involve complexities that do not appear in the general case and that may produce dierent notions of meaning depending on how the complexities are xed.
29
Most of the work in sections 4 and 5 was done to assure us that nothing irreducibly semantic lurks in the notion of information system viewed as a dynamical phenomenon.
30 Therefore, (1) can be achieved. (2) is much more dicult. It requires the specication of an information system that utilizes language semantically. This is a daunting task. 29 The theoretical method of generalization and re-instantiation is a great tool for resolving disagreement between competing theories of something (e.g. of meaning). By obtaining a general theory and then showing how specic but competing scenarios are instances of the generalization, one can demonstrate that the disagreement is not conceptual but results from a dierent xation of some theoretical parameters. It may turn out that both specic theories are correct but they are theories for dierent domains, and moreover, both are justied in using the same concept because the concept turns out to be a specic instance of the general concept.
30 There is one important contention here. Isn't the notion of goal, and thus purposeful system already semantic? Such an objection has been raised by Dretske (1988) in response to Bogdan, and more generally by Floridi (2010) . Careless use of goals can indeed sneak in semantics. The important thing is not to assume that goals are explicit (like desires). Goals should not be regarded as kinds of propositional attitudes. My, and I believe Bogdan's, notion of goal is not content determining. For Bogdan's reply to Dretske see (Bogdan 1988b) . In my case, the notion of purposeful system is purely dynamical. It captures a particular patterns of interaction between a system and its environment. Such a pattern may be selected by an external designer, in which case Floridi's zero semantic condition (Floridi & Taddeo 2005 , 2007 is not satised, but it could result from (or be) a natural pattern in the global dynamics. As it has been argued by some (Maturana & Varela 1980; Varela 2000; Weber & Varela 2002) , convincingly at least to me, the phenomenon of life may be related to the natural emergence of purposeful systems. This, however is a separate issue that I do not wish to discuss here. 31 Here I use the notion of process informally. It is assumed that the system is ultimately describable with a DSM.
Thus, in the expression, This is a chair, the meaning is given by some fact in the world that the object depicted by the indexical has the property of chairhood.
In an information system using language we can analyze this idea in a dierent way. The language medium, whose datum may be some structural equivalent to the expression This is a chair, interacts with other nonlinguistic media connected to perception, allowing the system to identify and interact with patterns in the world that can be clustered through some data state of some internal media. To make Fodor happy, we can assume that there is a single medium that gets in an in- Proponents of WSI are (Carnap & Bar-Hillel 1952; Fet-zer 2004) .
32 Another position insists that truthfulness must be included in the denition of information. This is the so called strongly semantic theory of information, (SSI) . Proponents include Dretske (1981); Barwise & Seligman (1997); Floridi (2010) . The most systematic defense of SSI can be found in Floridi (2004 Floridi ( , 2007 Floridi ( , 2010 would not argue for this here) that deliberative information is a cognitive phenomenon.
Which theory, WSI or SSI, needs the separation more? WSI cannot even be formulated with media for which questions (1) and (2) cannot be asked separately.
To say that meaning, but not truthfulness, is necessary for a datum to count as information demands specifying the meaning of the datum independent of the circumstances under which it is truthful. SSI does not require Using the notion of truthfulness in the situation is perhaps an undesirable stretch of terminology it should be reserved for declarative information but the informational states in the system are signicant because of the way they are actually correlated to the states of the world and because of the way they control the behavior of the system in light of those correlations. This is, I think, the true motivation behind the SSI. The insistence for the condition of truthfulness was never motivated by a conviction that a formal semantic valuation must be added to the concept of information. It is not about merely xing an alethic parameter to`true'.
The motivation behind the theory has always been the idea that when we say that someone has information about something we are interested in how the state of the world is internalized in the person (or organism, robot, etc.) and how the person can act accordingly.
When one asks for information about the weather one does not ask for a random meaningful statement with the weather as the topic; one asks for a link to the weather so that she can change her actions accordingly.
In a sense, the motivation behind SSI has always been (a hidden form of ) pragmatism. 
